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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEW
be to force litigants to the fullest preparation of their cases
before trial. This can best be accomplished by strictly en-
forcing the principles of law governing new trials.16
The State of North Dakota adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as part of the NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE in 1957.
Since that time the North Dakota courts have not been called upon
to construe Rule 60 (b) (2). It seems reasonable, however, that the
North Dakota courts would require a high degree of diligence in
procuring evidence before trial in order that newly discovered evi-
dence would be a means of obtaining a new trial. In requiring
this high degree of diligence, North Dakota should follow the federal
courts in strictly enforcing the rules governing the granting of new
trials for newly discovered evidence.
RONALD D. MARKOVITS
HUSBAND AND WIFE-WOMAN'S ACTION FOR Loss OF CON-
SORTIUM-DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX. - Plaintiff's hus-
band had been injured as a result of the negligent tort of the
defendant aluminum casting company. These injuries resulted in
the plaintiff's loss of consortium of her husband. The circuit court
sustained a demurrer on the grounds that loss of consortium does
not constitute a cause of action. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin held that the loss of consortium action was available
to women. Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d
542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
This case is in direct opposition to a recent Tennessee case
which held that a woman had no cause of action for the loss of
consortium due to her husband's injury although the husband would
have had an action if the wife had been so injured. The Tennes-
see court said this was not discrimination on the basis of sex, but
was no more than a practical and logical classification.,
The Tennessee decision is clearly within the majority in cases
involving negligent tort causing loss of consortium. It arises from
the early development of the concept as a cause of action for the
husband only and has continued thus for reasons both substantive
and procedural.
Emerging from the medieval concept of the marital union with
the wife being inferior,2 consortium was originally considered a
16. Moore v. Roseliff Realty Corp., 88 F. Supp. 956. 961 (D.N.J. 1960).
1. Krohn v. PRichardson, Merrill, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1966).
2. 10 Sr. LI ul U. I4 JT. 276, 277 (1965).
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property interest of the husband in his wife's domestic services.
The courts held this analogous with a master's interest in the
services of his servant.
8
Also, at common law, notice was taken only of wrongs done
to the superior of the parties related, leaving the inferior's loss
totally disregarded. 4 This is shown by the fact that as the ser-
vant had no property interest in his master, the wife likewise had
no property interest in her husband. 5
Procedurally, a wife could not recover because she had no
capacity to sue in her own name. The husband and wife were one
person in law with the wife being subservient. Therefore, a woman's
legal existence was suspended during marriage or at least incor-
porated and consolidated into that of her husband.0
From these beginnings, the right of a woman to sue for loss
of consortium has been greatly hampered. This is in spite of the
substantial change in the concept of consortium itself. This change
came early in the twentieth century with cases indicating that
consortium is no longer just a property right, but stands for loss
of society, companionship, conjugal affections, fellowship and as-
sistance.7 Later interpretations included sexual intercourse8
Meanwhile, women's rights in general have been greatly ex-
panded. With the passing of "Married Woman's Acts" in older
jurisdictions and inclusion of them in the constitutions of the newer
states,9 women have been granted much broader legal respect.
This fact was noted in a early North Dakota case involving
the distinction between husband's and wife's rights to sue for in-
tentional injury causing loss of consortium . . . i. e. alienation of
affections:
The tendency of modern thought is to abrogate the idea
of superior and inferior from the relationship of husband
and wife, as under statutes which have passed in various
states, married women are permitted to sue independently
of their husbands, and to hold separate property, the rea-
son for the distinction would no longer be tenable .... 10
Although this trend was accepted in several jurisdictions, the
majority has never recognized her right to maintain an action for
3. Guy v. LUvesy, 1 Cro. 502, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (K2B. 1618).
4. 3 BL.CrsTorN'S CoMMUNTARms 1139 (Lewis Ed., 1897).
. d.
6. BLACKsTON's COMMxNTARIEs 154 (Chase Ed. 1890).
7. See Rott v. Goehring, 83 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294, 296 (1916).
8. See Din v. Naiditch, 20 I1U.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 819 (1960).
9. The "Married Women's Acts" freed a woman from her procedural disabilities at
common law. See e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, sec. 1 (Smith Hurd, 1968); Mo. Rmv. STAT.
see. 451.250, 451.300 (1959).
10. Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294, 297 (1916), Court Citing 8 AM. &
ENa. ENC8V. OF ljaw (2 Ed.) 261.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
loss of consortium. 1 The reasoning of the majority follows several
paths. One is the contention that to allow the wife to collect dam-
ages when the husband can also sue would be condoning double
recovery. 12  Hitaffer v. Argonne's repudiated this contention by
pointing out that the loss of consortium is a separate and dis-
tinct injury from the actual physical injury to the husband. The
wife's action is confined to her independent loss, exclusive of any
impairment to earning capacity, health care and incidentals for
which the husband would be compensated. 4  In his action, she
has recovered nothing for her loss of society, affection, comfort, or
sexual intercourse."5
Another majority contention is that the courts recognize the
changes which have taken place in the development of consortium,
but that the judicial branch is powerless to act upon them. These
courts contend that the "Married Women's Acts" added no new
actions."6  It is in this line of reasoning that general policies
clash. On one hand it is true that security and certainty require
that accepted and established legal principles under which rights
accrue must be followed to lend a stability to the law."7 It is for
this reason that some courts have said that although the rights
should exist, precedent is too strong for not allowing it.18 How-
ever, the minority follows the opposing policy that changed con-
ditions warrant changes in the law.' 9 Further, it has been held
that as the common law in this area was originally judicially made
rather than by statute, the courts are the logical branch to effect
these needed changes.20
A third contention of the majority is that the injury to the
wife is too remote and indirect to be compensible. Fearing even
greater expansion in the field of liability, it has been said that
each man's life is linked with the lives of many others. Thus it
should not be suggested that everyone who is adversely affected
11. Rush v. Great American insurance Co., 218 Tenn. 506, 376 S.W.2d 454, 458 (1964) ;
Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1958) ; Fischbach v. Auto Boys, Inc.,
106 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (1951); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 82 S.E.2d
611, 613 (1945); Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860, 964 (1933).
12. Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation, 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100, 110-1 (1937);
Toblasen v. Palley, 96 N.J.L. 66, 114 A. 153, 154 (1921).
18. Hlitaffer v. Argonne, 188 F.2d 311, 814 (D.C. Cr. 1950,).
14. Id.
15. Yonner v. Adams, 167 A.2d 717, 728 (Del. 1961).
16. Nash v. Mobile Ry., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100, 101 (1928); Bernhardt v. Perry
276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462, 466; error dismissed, 254 U.S. 662 (1918).
Cf. Southern Ry. v. Maples, 201 Tenn. 85, 296 S.W.2d 870, 873 (1956). "It is set-
tied law In this state that rules of the common law are not repealed by implication. . .
If the statute does not Include and cover such a case, it leaves the law as it was before
enactment"
17. See Ottertail Power Co. v. Van Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d 599, 607 (1942).
18. Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1953) (dictum).
19. Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark., 851, 299 S.W.2d 41, 46
(1957).
20. See genIWIJS Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 42, 141 A.2d 276,
293 (1958).
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by an injury inflicted upon another should be allowed to recover
his damages. 21 The minority suggests that consortium could hardly
be stretched to include others affected by the injury. By defin-
ition the interest is one which is confined to the husband and
wife relationship. 22 As for being indirect and remote, it would be
incongruent to allow this line of reasoning to bar a wife's re-
covery when the same is not applied to bar a husband's recovery
under reversed circumstances.
Having thus viewed the majority and minority stands, the
question remaining is what would be the most efficient and sensible
method of disposing of the problem and the conflicting laws.
Some jurisdictions have in the past suggested dropping the
rights of both husband and wife in the case of consortium lost by
negligence of a third party. 23 This is, however, opposed by aca-
demic writers on the basis that actual injury does accrue.2 ' The
elimination of an entire action would leave those injured unpro-
tected.
Some courts have favored legislation as the means of alleviat-
ing the problem.2 5 However, this is a slow process as has been
seen from the fact that changes have been urged in this area
for at least two decades with minimal results.
The remedy which appears to be the most logical and which
could be most readily implemented is the one followed recently
in Ohio and Illinois cases. It was held there that to deny a wife
an action for the loss of consortium while allowing a cause of
action to her spouse would be to deny the wife her constitutional
rights.26 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution reads in part . . . "Nor shall any State . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws..."
This has been held to require that all persons similarly situated
be treated alike although it does not prohibit differences reason-
ably related to the purpose which state laws, rules and regulations
seek to accomplish.2 7
Although sex may be a legal basis for difference in some
areas, 2 the equalizing of married women's procedual rights has
21. Dint v. Nalditch, 20 1ll.2d 406, 17 N.E.2d 881, 894 (1960).
22. Flendermeyer v. Casper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102, 105 (1908).
23. Helmstetler v. Duke Power, 224 N.C. 81, 82 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1945) ; Marri v.
Stamford Street Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582, 586 (1911).
24. Simeone, The Wife's Action for Low. of Consortiim-Progress or No?, 4 ST. Louis
T1.L.J. 424, 438 (1957).
25. Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1955)
Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ; Ash v. S. S. Mullen,
Inc., 42 Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118, 120 (1958).
26. Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820, 821 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Clem v.
Brown, 32 Ohio Op.2d 477, 207 N.E.2d 898, 402 (1965).
27. Acoord Maker v. Town of Brookline, 339 Mass. 209, 158 N.E.2d 320, 823 (1959).
28. Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex. 1962) (Prohibiting person
of one sex from giving massages to opposite sex in a massage establishment is not
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eliminated the legitimate distinctions which produced differences
in treatment concerning loss of consortium. Gone is the practical
and logical classification of which the Tennessee court speaks.
Thus the proper course for a lagging jurisdiction would be to hold
that denying a wife an action for loss of consortium caused by
negligence also deprives her of "equal protection of the law."
This problem has not come to the attention of the North Da-
kota courts. However, I believe that the courts could logically
hold, as they did in alienation of affections, that the legal dis-
tinctions between husband and wife in this area of law no longer
are tenable,2 9 and thus the wife would have a right to sue for
loss of consortium caused by negligence on an equal basis with
her husband.
GERALD RUSTAD
discrimination based on sex); Clark v. California Employment Stabilization Comm., 882
P.2d 716, 718 (1958) (Provisions of employment insurance statutes denying disability
arises or is caused by pregnancy Is not discrimination based on sex).
29. Supra not* 10.
2MO
